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Abstract
Memory-one strategies are a set of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies that have been acclaimed
for their mathematical tractability and performance against single opponents. This manuscript investi-
gates best responses to a collection of memory-one strategies as a multidimensional optimisation problem.
Though extortionate memory-one strategies have gained much attention, we demonstrate that best re-
sponse memory-one strategies do not behave in an extortionate way, and moreover, for memory one
strategies to be evolutionary robust they need to be able to behave in a forgiving way. We also provide
evidence that memory-one strategies suffer from their limited memory in multi agent interactions and
can be out performed by longer memory strategies.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a two player game used in understanding the evolution of cooperative
behaviour, formally introduced in [5]. Each player has two options, to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The
decisions are made simultaneously and independently. The normal form representation of the game is given
by:
Sp =
R S
T P
 Sq =
R T
S P
 (1)
where Sp represents the utilities of the row player and Sq the utilities of the column player. The payoffs,
(R,P, S, T ), are constrained by T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S, and the most common values used in the
literature are (R,P, S, T ) = (3, 1, 0, 5) [3]. The PD is a one shot game, however, it is commonly studied in a
manner where the history of the interactions matters. The repeated form of the game is called the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD).
Memory-one strategies are a set of IPD strategies that have been studied thoroughly in the literature [22, 23],
however, they have gained most of their attention when a certain subset of memory-one strategies was
introduced in [24], the zero-determinant strategies (ZDs). In [25] it was stated that “Press and Dyson have
fundamentally changed the viewpoint on the Prisoner’s Dilemma”. A special case of ZDs are extortionate
strategies that choose their actions so that a linear relationship is forced between the players’ score ensuring
that they will always receive at least as much as their opponents. ZDs are indeed mathematically unique
and are proven to be robust in pairwise interactions, however, their true effectiveness in tournaments and
evolutionary dynamics has been questioned [2, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18].
In a similar fashion to [24] the purpose of this work is to consider a given memory-one strategy; however,
whilst [24] found a way for a player to manipulate a given opponent, this work will consider a multidimensional
optimisation approach to identify the best response to a given group of opponents. In particular, this work
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presents a compact method of identifying the best response memory-one strategy against a given set of
opponents, and evaluates whether it behaves in a zero-determinant way which in turn indicates whether it
can be extortionate. This is also done in evolutionary settings. Moreover, we introduce a well designed
framework that allows the comparison of an optimal memory one strategy and a more complex strategy
which has a larger memory, and an identification of conditions for which defection is known to be stable;
thus identifying environments where cooperation will not occur.
Methods and Results
Utility
One specific advantage of memory-one strategies is their mathematical tractability. They can be represented
completely as an element of R4[0,1]. This originates from [21] where it is stated that if a strategy is concerned
with only the outcome of a single turn then there are four possible ‘states’ the strategy could be in; both
players cooperated (CC), the first player cooperated whilst the second player defected (CD), the first player
defected whilst the second player cooperated (DC) and both players defected (DD). Therefore, a memory-one
strategy can be denoted by the probability vector of cooperating after each of these states; p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) ∈
R4[0,1].
In [21] it was shown that it is not necessary to simulate the play of a strategy p against a memory-one
opponent q. Rather this exact behaviour can be modeled as a stochastic process, and more specifically as
a Markov chain whose corresponding transition matrix M is given by Eq. 2. The long run steady state
probability vector v, which is the solution to vM = v, can be combined with the payoff matrices of Ep. 1 to
give the expected payoffs for each player. More specifically, the utility for a memory-one strategy p against
an opponent q, denoted as uq(p), is given by Eq. 3.
M =

p1q1 p1 (−q1 + 1) q1 (−p1 + 1) (−p1 + 1) (−q1 + 1)
p2q3 p2 (−q3 + 1) q3 (−p2 + 1) (−p2 + 1) (−q3 + 1)
p3q2 p3 (−q2 + 1) q2 (−p3 + 1) (−p3 + 1) (−q2 + 1)
p4q4 p4 (−q4 + 1) q4 (−p4 + 1) (−p4 + 1) (−q4 + 1)
 (2)
uq(p) = v · (R,S, T, P ). (3)
This manuscript has explored the form of uq(p), to the authors knowledge no previous work has done this,
and it proves that uq(p) is given by a ratio of two quadratic forms [15], (Theorem 2):
uq(p) =
1
2pQp
T + cp + a
1
2pQ¯p
T + c¯p + a¯
, (4)
where Q = Q(q), Q¯ = Q¯(q) ∈ R4×4, c = c(q) and c¯ = c¯(q) ∈ R4×1, a = a(q) and a¯ = a¯(q) ∈ R.
This can be extended to consider multiple opponents. The IPD is commonly studied in tournaments and/or
Moran Processes where a strategy interacts with a number of opponents. The payoff of a player in such
interactions is given by the average payoff the player received against each opponent. More specifically the
expected utility of a memory-one strategy against a N number of opponents is given by:
2
1N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
( 12pQ
(i)pT + c(i)p + a(i))
N∏
j = 1
j 6= i
( 12pQ¯
(j)pT + c¯(j)p + a¯(j))
N∏
i=1
( 12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i))
. (5)
Estimating the utility of a memory-one strategy against any number of opponents without simulating the
interactions is the main result used in the rest of this manuscript. It will be used to obtain best response
memory-one strategies, in tournaments and evolutionary dynamics, and to explore the conditions under which
defection dominates cooperation.
Stability of defection
An immediate result from our formulation can be obtained by evaluating the sign of Eq. 5’s derivative at
p = (0, 0, 0, 0). If at that point the derivative is negative, then the utility of a player only decreases if they
were to change their behaviour, and thus defection at that point is stable.
Lemma 1. In a tournament of N players {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] defection is stable if the
transition probabilities of the opponents satisfy conditions Eq. 6 and Eq. 7.
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i)) ≤ 0 (6)
while,
N∑
i=1
a¯(i) 6= 0 (7)
Proof. For defection to be stable the derivative of the utility at the point p = (0, 0, 0, 0) must be negative.
Substituting p = (0, 0, 0, 0) in Eq. 22 gives:
d
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=(0,0,0,0)
=
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i))
(a¯(i))2
(8)
The sign of the numerator
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i)) can vary based on the transition probabilities of the
opponents. The denominator can not be negative, and otherwise is always positive. Thus the sign of the
derivative is negative if and only if
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i)) ≤ 0.
3
Consider a population for which defection is known to be stable. In that population all the members will
over time adopt the same behaviour; thus in such population cooperation will never take over. This is
demonstrated in Fig. 1. These have been simulated using [1] an open source research framework for the
study of the IPD.
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Figure 1: A. For q1 = (0.22199, 0.87073, 0.20672, 0.91861), q2 = (0.48841, 0.61174, 0.76591, 0.51842) and
q3 = (0.2968, 0.18772, 0.08074, 0.73844), Eq. 6 and Eq. 7 hold and Defector takes over the popula-
tion. B. For q1 = (0.96703, 0.54723, 0.97268, 0.71482), q2 = (0.69773, 0.21609, 0.97627, 0.0062) and q3 =
(0.25298, 0.43479, 0.77938, 0.19769), Eq. 6 fails and Defector does not take over the population.
Best response memory-one strategies
As discussed ZDs have been acclaimed for their robustness against a single opponent. ZDs are evidence that
extortion works in pairwise interactions, their behaviour ensures that the strategies will never lose a game.
However, this paper argues that in multi opponent interactions, where the payoffs matter, strategies trying
to exploit their opponents will suffer. Compared to ZDs, best response memory-one strategies, which have a
theory of mind of their opponents, utilise their behaviour in order to gain the most from their interactions.
The question that arises then is whether best response strategies are optimal because they behave in an
extortionate way.
To answer this question, we initially define memory-one best response strategies as a multi dimensional
optimisation problem given by:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
such that : p ∈ R[0,1]
(9)
Optimising this particular ratio of quadratic forms is not trivial. It can be verified empirically for the case of
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a single opponent that there exists at least one point for which the definition of concavity does not hold. The
non concavity of u(p) indicates multiple local optimal points. This is also intuitive. The best response against
a cooperator, q = (1, 1, 1, 1), is a defector p∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0). The strategies p = ( 12 , 0, 0, 0) and p = (
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 )
are also best responses. The approach taken here is to introduce a compact way of constructing the discrete
candidate set of all local optimal points, and evaluating the objective function Eq. 5. This gives the best
response memory-one strategy. The approach is given in Theorem 3.
Finding best response memory-one strategies is analytically feasible using the formulation of Theorem 3 and
resultant theory [14]. However, for large systems building the resultant becomes intractable. As a result, best
responses will be estimated heuristically using a numerical method, suitable for problems with local optima,
called Bayesian optimisation [20].
This is extended to evolutionary settings. In these settings self interactions are key. Self interactions can
be incorporated in the formulation that has been used so far. More specifically, the optimisation problem of
Eq. 26 is extended to include self interactions:
max
p
:
1
N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) + up(p)
such that : p ∈ R[0,1]
(10)
For determining the memory-one best response in an evolutionary setting, an algorithmic approach is consid-
ered, called best response dynamics. The best response dynamics approach used in this manuscript is given
by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Best response dynamics Algorithm
p(t) ← (1, 1, 1, 1);
while p(t) 6= p(t−1) do
p(t+1) = argmax 1N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p(t+1)) + u
(t)
p (p(t+1));
end
The results of this section use Bayesian optimisation to generate a data set of best response memory-one
strategies, in tournaments and evolutionary dynamics whilst N = 2. The data set is available at [6]. It
contains a total of 1000 trials corresponding to 1000 different instances of a best response strategy in tour-
naments and evolutionary dynamics. For each trial a set of 2 opponents is randomly generated and the
memory-one best responses against them is found.
The source code used in this manuscript has been written in a sustainable manner [4]. It is open source
(https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3/Memory-size-in-the-prisoners-dilemma) and tested which ensures
the validity of the results. It has also been archived and can be found at [7].
In order to investigate whether best responses behave in an extortionate matter the SSE method [17] is used.
In [17] it is proven that all extortionate ZDs reside on a triangular plane. For a given p, a strategy x∗ is
defined as the nearest ZDs. The distance between the two strategies is explicitly calculated and referred to
as the sum of squared errors of prediction (SSE); which corresponds to how far p is from behaving as a ZDs.
Thus, a high SSE implies non ZD, which in turn implies a non extortionate behaviour. The SSE method
has been applied to the data set. A statistics summary of the SSE distribution for the best response in
tournaments and evolutionary dynamics is given in Table 1.
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mean std 5% 50% 95% max median skew kurt
Tournament 0.34 0.40 0.028 0.17 1.05 2.47 0.17 1.87 3.60
Evolutionary Setting 0.17 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.67 1.53 0.12 3.42 1.92
Table 1: SSE of best response memory-one when N = 2
For the best response in tournaments the distribution of SSE is skewed to the left, indicating that the best
response does exhibit ZDs behaviour and so could be extortionate, however, the best response is not uniformly
a ZDs. A positive measure of skewness and kurtosis indicates a heavy tail to the right. Therefore, in several
cases the strategy is not trying to extort its opponents. Similarly the evolutionary best response strategy
does not behave uniformly extortionately. A larger value of both the kurtosis and the skewness of the SSE
distribution indicates that in evolutionary settings a memory-one best response is even more adaptable.
The difference between best responses in tournaments and in evolutionary settings is further explored by
Fig. 2. Though, no statistically significant differences have been found, from Fig. 2, it seems that evolutionary
best response has a higher median p2; which corresponds to the probability of cooperating after receiving a
defection. Thus, they are more likely to forgive after being tricked. This is due to the fact that they could
be playing against themselves, and they need to be able to forgive so that future cooperation can occur.
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Figure 2: Distributions of p∗ for best responses in tournaments and evolutionary settings. The medians,
denoted as p¯∗, for tournaments are p¯∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0), and for evolutionary settings p¯∗ = (0, 0.19, 0, 0).
Longer memory best responses
This section focuses on the memory size of strategies. The effectiveness of memory in the IPD has been
previously explored in the literature, however, no one has compared the performance of longer-memory
strategies to memory-one best responses.
In [8], a strategy called Gambler which makes probabilistic decisions based on the opponent’s n1 first moves,
the opponent’s m1 last moves and the player’s m2 last moves was introduced. In this manuscript Gambler
with parameters: n1 = 2,m1 = 1 and m2 = 1 is used as a longer-memory strategy. By considering the
opponent’s first two moves, the opponents last move and the player’s last move, there are only 16 (4× 2× 2)
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possible outcomes that can occur, furthermore, Gambler also makes a probabilistic decision of cooperating in
the opening move. Thus, Gambler is a function f : {C, D} → [0, 1]R. This can be hard coded as an element
of [0, 1]16+1R , one probability for each outcome plus the opening move. Hence, compared to Eq. 26, finding
an optimal Gambler is a 17 dimensional problem given by:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
Uq
(i)(f)
such that : f ∈ R17[0,1]
(11)
Note that Eq. 5 can not be used here for the utility of Gambler, and actual simulated players are used. This
is done using [1] with 500 turns and 200 repetitions, moreover, Eq. 11 is solved numerically using Bayesian
optimisation.
Similarly to previous sections, a large data set has been generated with instances of an optimal Gambler
and a memory-one best response, available at [6]. Estimating a best response Gambler (17 dimensions) is
computational more expensive compared to a best response memory-one (4 dimensions). As a result, the
analysis of this section is based on a total of 152 trials. For each trial two random opponents have been
selected. The 152 pair of opponents are a sub set of the opponents used in the previous section.
The ratio between Gambler’s utility and the best response memory-one strategy’s utility has been calculated
and its distribution in given in Fig. 3. It is evident from Fig. 3 that Gambler always performs as well as the
best response memory-one strategy and often performs better. There are no points where the ratio value is
less than 1, thus Gambler never performed less than the best response memory-one strategy. This seems to
be at odd with the result of [24] that against a memory-one opponent having a longer memory will not give
a strategy any advantage. However, against two memory-one opponents, Gambler’s performance is better
than the optimal memory-one strategy. This is evidence that in the case of two opponents having a shorter
memory is limiting and this is potentially another example of the advantages of adaptability.
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Figure 3: The ratio between the utilities of Gambler and best response memory-one strategy for 152 different
pair of opponents.
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Discussion
This manuscript has considered best response strategies in the IPD game, and more specifically, memory-one
best responses. It has proven that there is a compact way of identifying a memory-one best response to
a group of opponents, and moreover it obtained a condition for which in an environment of memory-one
opponents defection is the stable choice, based only on the coefficients of the opponents. The later parts
of this paper focused on a series of empirical results, where it was shown that the performance and the
evolutionary stability of memory-one strategies rely on adaptability and not on extortion. Finally, it was
shown that memory-one strategies’ performance is limited by their memory in cases where they interact with
multiple opponents.
Following the work described in [21], where it was shown that the utility between two memory-one strategies
can be estimated by a Markov stationary state, we proved that the utilities can be written as a ration of two
quadratic forms in R4, Theorem 2. This was extended to include multiple opponents, as the IPD is commonly
studied in such situations. This formulation allowed us to introduce an approach for identifying memory-one
best responses to any number of opponents; Theorem 3. This does not only have game theoretic novelty, but
also a mathematical novelty of solving quadratic ratio optimisation problems where the quadratics are non
concave. The results were used to define a condition for which defection is known to be stable.
This manuscript presented several experimental results. All data for the results is archived in [6]. These
results were mainly to investigate the behaviour of memory-one strategies and their limitations. A large data
set which contained best responses in tournaments and in evolutionary settings for N = 2 was generated.
This allowed us to investigate their respective behaviours, and whether it was extortionate acts that made
them the most favorable strategies. However, it was shown that it was not extortion but adaptability that
allowed the strategies to gain the most from their interactions. In evolutionary settings it was shown that the
best response strategy was even more adaptable, and there is some evidence that it is more likely to forgive
after being tricked. Moreover, the performance of memory-one strategies was put against the performance
of a longer memory strategy called Gambler. There were several cases where Gambler would outperform the
memory-one strategy, however, a memory-one strategy never managed to outperform a Gambler. This result
occurred whilst considering a Gambler with a sufficiently larger memory but not a sufficiently larger amount
of information regarding the game.
All the empirical results presented in this manuscript have been for the case of N = 2. In future work we
would consider larger values of N , however, we believe that for larger values of N the results that have been
presented here would only be more evident. In addition, we would investigate potential theoretical results
for the evolutionary best responses dynamics algorithm discussed.
By specifically exploring the entire memory space-one strategies to identify the optimal strategy for a variety
of situations, this work casts doubt on the effectiveness of ZDs, highlights the importance of adaptability and
provides a framework for the continued understanding of these important questions.
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Appendix
Theorem 2
Theorem 2. The expected utility of a memory-one strategy p ∈ R4[0,1] against a memory-one opponent
q ∈ R4[0,1], denoted as uq(p), can be written as a ratio of two quadratic forms:
uq(p) =
1
2pQp
T + cp + a
1
2pQ¯p
T + c¯p + a¯
, (12)
where Q, Q¯ ∈ R4×4 are square matrices defined by the transition probabilities of the opponent q1, q2, q3, q4 as
follows:
Q =

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) q3 (q1 − q2) −5q3 (q1 − q4)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2)
q3 (q1 − q2) (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) 0 3q3 (q2 − q4)
−5q3 (q1 − q4) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2) 3q3 (q2 − q4) 0
, (13)
Q¯ =

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − q4 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) (q1 − q4) (q2 − q3 − 1)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − q4 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4)
(q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) (q2 − q3) (q1 − q4 − 1) 0 − (q2 − q4) (q1 − q3 − 1)
(q1 − q4) (q2 − q3 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) − (q2 − q4) (q1 − q3 − 1) 0
. (14)
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c and c¯ ∈ R4×1 are similarly defined by:
c =

q1 (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
− (q3 − 1) (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
−q1q2 + q2q3 + 3q2q4 + q2 − q3
5q1q4 − 3q2q4 − 5q3q4 + 5q3 − 2q4
, (15)
c¯ =

q1 (q2 − q4 − 1)
− (q3 − 1) (q2 − q4 − 1)
−q1q2 + q2q3 + q2 − q3 + q4
q1q4 − q2 − q3q4 + q3 − q4 + 1
, (16)
and the constant terms a, a¯ are defined as a = −q2 + 5q4 + 1 and a¯ = −q2 + q4 + 1.
Proof. It was discussed that uq(p) it is the product of the steady states v and the PD payoffs,
uq(p) = v · (R,S, T, P ).
More specifically, with (R,P, S, T ) = (3, 1, 0, 5)
uq(p) =

p1p2(q1q2 − 5q1q4 − q1 − q2q3 + 5q3q4 + q3) + p1p3(−q1q3 + q2q3) + p1p4(5q1q3 − 5q3q4) + p3p4(−3q2q3 + 3q3q4)+
p2p3(−q1q2 + q1q3 + 3q2q4 + q2 − 3q3q4 − q3) + p2p4(−5q1q3 + 5q1q4 + 3q2q3 − 3q2q4 + 2q3 − 2q4)+
p1(−q1q2 + 5q1q4 + q1) + p2(q2q3 − q2 − 5q3q4 − q3 + 5q4 + 1) + p3(q1q2 − q2q3 − 3q2q4 − q2 + q3)+
p4(−5q1q4 + 3q2q4 + 5q3q4 − 5q3 + 2q4) + q2 − 5q4 − 1
p1p2(q1q2−q1q4−q1−q2q3+q3q4+q3)+p1p3(−q1q3+q1q4+q2q3−q2q4)+p1p4(−q1q2+q1q3+q1+q2q4−q3q4−q4)+
p2p3(−q1q2+q1q3+q2q4+q2−q3q4−q3)+p2p4(−q1q3+q1q4+q2q3−q2q4)+p3p4(q1q2−q1q4−q2q3−q2+q3q4+q4)+
p1(−q1q2+q1q4+q1)+p2(q2q3−q2−q3q4−q3+q4+1)+p3(q1q2−q2q3−q2+q3−q4)+p4(−q1q4+q2+q3q4−q3+q4−1)+
q2 − q4 − 1

.
(17)
Let us consider the numerator of uq(p). The cross product terms pipj are given by,
p1p2(q1q2 − 5q1q4 − q1 − q2q3 + 5q3q4 + q3) + p1p3(−q1q3 + q2q3) + p1p4(5q1q3 − 5q3q4) + p3p4(−3q2q3 + 3q3q4)+
p2p3(−q1q2 + q1q3 + 3q2q4 + q2 − 3q3q4 − q3) + p2p4(−5q1q3 + 5q1q4 + 3q2q3 − 3q2q4 + 2q3 − 2q4).
This can be re written in a matrix format given by Eq. 18.
(p1, p2, p3, p4)
1
2

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) q3 (q1 − q2) −5q3 (q1 − q4)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2)
q3 (q1 − q2) (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) 0 3q3 (q2 − q4)
−5q3 (q1 − q4) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2) 3q3 (q2 − q4) 0


p1
p2
p3
p4
 (18)
Similarly, the linear terms are given by,
p1(−q1q2 + 5q1q4 + q1) + p2(q2q3 − q2 − 5q3q4 − q3 + 5q4 + 1) + p3(q1q2 − q2q3 − 3q2q4 − q2 + q3)+
p4(−5q1q4 + 3q2q4 + 5q3q4 − 5q3 + 2q4).
and the expression can be written using a matrix format as Eq. 19.
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(p1, p2, p3, p4)

q1 (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
− (q3 − 1) (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
−q1q2 + q2q3 + 3q2q4 + q2 − q3
5q1q4 − 3q2q4 − 5q3q4 + 5q3 − 2q4
 (19)
Finally, the constant term of the numerator, which is obtained by substituting p = (0, 0, 0, 0), is given by
Eq. 20.
q2 − 5q4 − 1 (20)
Combining Eq. 18, Eq. 19 and Eq. 20 gives that the numerator of uq(p) can be written as,
1
2
p

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) q3 (q1 − q2) −5q3 (q1 − q4)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2)
q3 (q1 − q2) (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) 0 3q3 (q2 − q4)
−5q3 (q1 − q4) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2) 3q3 (q2 − q4) 0
 pT+

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) q3 (q1 − q2) −5q3 (q1 − q4)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2)
q3 (q1 − q2) (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) 0 3q3 (q2 − q4)
−5q3 (q1 − q4) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2) 3q3 (q2 − q4) 0
 p + q2 − 5q4 − 1
and equivalently as,
1
2
pQpT + cp + a
where Q ∈ R4×4 is a square matrix defined by the transition probabilities of the opponent q1, q2, q3, q4 as
follows:
Q =

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) q3 (q1 − q2) −5q3 (q1 − q4)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − 5q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2)
q3 (q1 − q2) (q2 − q3) (q1 − 3q4 − 1) 0 3q3 (q2 − q4)
−5q3 (q1 − q4) (q3 − q4) (5q1 − 3q2 − 2) 3q3 (q2 − q4) 0
,
c ∈ R4×1 is similarly defined by:
c =

q1 (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
− (q3 − 1) (q2 − 5q4 − 1)
−q1q2 + q2q3 + 3q2q4 + q2 − q3
5q1q4 − 3q2q4 − 5q3q4 + 5q3 − 2q4
,
and a = −q2 + 5q4 + 1.
The same process is done for the denominator.
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Theorem 3
Theorem 3. The optimal behaviour of a memory-one strategy player p∗ ∈ R4[0,1] against a set of N opponents
{q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] is given by:
p∗ = argmax
N∑
i=1
uq(p), p ∈ Sq.
The set Sq is defined as all the possible combinations of:
Sq =

p ∈ R4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and
d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0
for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}4

. (21)
Note that there is no immediate way to find the zeros of ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p) where,
d
dp
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)
(p) =
N∑
i=1
(
pQ(i) + c(i)
)(
1
2pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i)
)
(
1
2pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i)
)2 −
(
pQ¯(i) + c¯(i)
)(
1
2pQ
(i)pT + c(i)p + a(i)
)
(
1
2pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i)
)2 (22)
For ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p) to equal zero then:
N∑
i=1
(
pQ
(i)
+ c
(i)
)( 1
2
pQ¯
(i)
p
T
+ c¯
(i)
p + a¯
(i)
)
−
(
pQ¯
(i)
+ c¯
(i)
)( 1
2
pQ
(i)
p
T
+ c
(i)
p + a
(i)
)
= 0, while (23)
N∑
i=1
1
2
pQ¯
(i)
p
T
+ c¯
(i)
p + a¯
(i) 6= 0. (24)
Proof. The optimal behaviour of a memory-one strategy player p∗ ∈ R4[0,1] against a set of N opponents
{q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] is established by:
p∗ = argmax
(
N∑
i=1
uq(p)
)
, p ∈ Sq,
where Sq is given by:
Sq =

p ∈ R4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and
d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0
for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}4

. (25)
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The optimisation problem of Eq. 26
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
such that : p ∈ R[0,1]
(26)
can be written as:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
such that : pi ≤ 1 for ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
−pi ≤ 0 for ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
(27)
The optimisation problem has two inequality constraints and regarding the optimality this means that:
• either the optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain, and so the constraints plays
no role;
• or the optimum is on the constraint boundary.
Thus, the following three cases must be considered:
Case 1: The solution is on the boundary and any of the possible combinations for pi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
are candidate optimal solutions.
Case 2: The optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain and the interior solution p∗
necessarily satisfies the condition ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p
∗) = 0.
Case 3: The optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain but some constraints are
equalities. The candidate solutions in this case are any combinations of pj ∈ {0, 1} and ddpk
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0
forall j ∈ J & k ∈ K forall J,K where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Combining cases 1-3 a set of candidate solution is constructed as:
Sq =

p ∈ R4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and
d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0 for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}4

.
This set is denoted as Sq and the optimal solution to Eq. 26 is the point from Sq for which the utility is
maximised.
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